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1. THE MAKING OF MIRRORS 
In Spring 1801, absolute idealism materialised in Jena as the 
shared project of F.W.J. Schelling and G.W.F. Hegel. Central to it 
were the critique of contemporary philosophy as “reflective” and 
the assertion of a new “speculative standpoint”—even if the very 
constitution of the meanings of “reflection,” “speculation” and their 
relationship was a task that consumed the subsequent years. For 
what followed over the next fifty years was (in part) a series of 
experiments in speculative philosophy, attempts to model thinking 
as a “magical and symbolic mirror.” 
 The concepts of both reflection and speculation gain their 
sense from the workings of the mirror: its ontology of original and 
image (which both is and is not the original) and its evaluative 
criteria of fidelity (seeing face-to-face) and inaccuracy (seeing 
darkly). The description of thought as mirror (while traditional) 
takes on a new urgency from 1801 onwards in the task of 
differentiating between two types of mirror: a narcissistic, reflective 
mirror which is to be avoided and a magical, speculative mirror 
which all philosophers must strive to silver. What distinguishes 
these types of mirror—that is, the conditions of silvering that 
account for the transition from reflection to speculation—are 
Schelling and Hegel’s concerns. 
 What is more, it is important to bear in mind that what 
concretely constitute these mirrors are the philosopher and her text. 
It is for the philosopher to think and write in such a way that 
reality reflects itself in a speculative rather than merely reflective 
manner. It is for the philosopher to silver herself so as to become 
speculative. Behind Hegel and Schelling’s appropriation of this 
optical imagery therefore lie the questions: how does one become a 
speculative philosopher? What practices and exercises are required 
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to transform oneself and one’s writing from a reflective state to a 
speculative one? In other words, in what do speculative forms of 
life consist? 
 In what follows, I consider two passages from Schelling’s later 
work in which he attempts to model a speculative form of life. 
What is most revealing about these examples of “the formation of 
the speculative”1 is that Schelling’s chosen dialogue partners are 
not canonical philosophers, but heretical mystics: Böhme and 
Swedenborg. In order to theorise the becoming-speculative of the 
philosophical mirror, Schelling resorts to mystical texts; and yet he 
is always clear—although for very different reasons at different 
moments—mysticism is only a dialogue partner. The mystical text 
cannot be the answer, even if it does still point the philosopher on 
her way. 
 
Consideration of a passage repeated in both the Lectures on 
Philosophy of Art and the Lectures on Method (On University 
Studies) will help bring out further the key issues at play in this 
recourse to mysticism. Schelling writes, “Art contemplates the 
intimate essence of the science of the absolute (philosophy) as in a 
magical and symbolic mirror.”2 The artistic medium reflects—and 
so mediates—philosophical ideas. And there is, of course, also an 
art to philosophising itself: the philosopher too must hold up a 
mirror to her thinking through the written or spoken word. 
Articulation is necessarily mediation. So, one of the stakes in 
philosophising is the nature of the philosopher’s mirror—what it 
reflects and how it reflects it. That is, what is at stake is how the 
mirror is manufactured, the silvering process that goes into its 
creation. The art of the philosopher includes the art of making 
mirrors as well as looking into them—the production of “that dull 
surface without which no reflection and no specular and 
speculative activity would be possible.”3 The philosopher mediates 
                                                                                                              
1 F.W.J. Schelling, Briefe und Dokumente vol. 2, ed. Horst Fuhrmans (Bonn: 
Bouvier, 1962-75), 436. 
2 F.W.J. Schelling, Philosophy of Art, trans. Douglas W. Stott (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 8; On University Studies, trans. E.S. 
Morgan (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1966), 150. 
3 Rodolphe Gasché, The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of 
Reflection (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), 6. In many 
ways, what follows is an implicit commentary on the opening to Gasché’s 
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reality through herself and her text—and it is not just the success of 
such mediation that distinguishes a good from a bad philosopher, it 
is also the type of mediation she forges in the first place. 
However, as the above quotation implies, the philosopher still 
possesses a quite unique relation to her ideas: for while the artist 
can only reflect on such ideas from without, the philosopher 
reflects what she already thinks. The philosopher stands in both a 
mediated and immediate relation to philosophy. What Hyppolite 
writes of Hegelian thought applies to the above too: “The 
immediate itself reflects itself, and this identity of reflection and the 
immediate corresponds to philosophical knowledge as such.”4 In 
other words, the artist is forever attempting in vain to recover a lost 
immediacy; the philosopher negotiates an immediacy always already 
present. Schelling’s acknowledgement of this presence is seemingly 
what forces him to begin with philosophy already presupposed—
that is, to philosophise “like a shot from a pistol” or to “fall head 
over heels into the absolute.”5  
And yet, as this essay progresses, we will come to see Schelling 
criticise precisely this philosophical illusion of the givenness of 
thought. That is, the above proposes an idealist fiction: that 
thought is given first (and given first to the philosopher alone). And 
while he remains committed to this fiction, Schelling will never tire 
of putting it into question as well.6 Throughout his works, he 
uncovers the pre-philosophical, pre-textual practices that give rise 
to thought. Ideas are mediated and reflected prior to philosophy. 
Hence, while to the philosopher thought appears immediate, such 
immediacy depends on the forgetting of the very process of 
becoming-philosophical (the Bildung of the philosopher or “the 
formation of the speculative”). 
                                                                                                              
work and his marginalisation of Schelling’s role in “the formation of the 
speculative.” See especially ibid., 23-4. 
4 Jean Hyppolite, Logic and Existence, trans. Leonard Lawlor and Amit Sen 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1997), 84-5; this translation from Gasché, The Tain 
of the Mirror, 34. 
5 Respectively: G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), §27; Frederick C. Beiser, German 
Idealism: The Struggle against Subjectivism 1781-1801 (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2002), 588. 
6 Implicit here is a rejection of any simplistic distinction between the 
“early”, idealist Schelling and the “late”, critical Schelling. 
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Already a tangled dialectic is emerging—and this tangle will 
only increase as we weave our way through Schelling’s 
engagements with mysticism. Philosophical ideas are immediate 
but need to be mediated to retain their immediacy. This is the 
necessity of silvering or the requisite indifference of mediacy and 
immediacy—the speculative ideal. At the same time, such immediacy 
is also dependent on prior practices of becoming-philosophical in 
the first place (breeding speculative forms of life). Immediacy is 
dependent on both prior and posterior mediation to be articulated 
as immediacy—and what is more it is also dependent on the 
philosophical forgetting of precisely these practices. What follows is 
(to some extent, at least) a survey of the ways in which Schelling 
encounters the mystical text in order to remember—to remember, that 
is, the vast panoply of mediations necessary for philosophical 
claims to immediacy. Together these recovered exercises in 
mediation form the art of immediacy. 
I argue, however, that it is Schelling’s recovery of the pre-
philosophical practices of mediation in particular which constitute 
his most significant achievement in this regard. As the above 
analysis of Schelling’s appeal to “the magical and symbolic mirror” 
of speculation has already made clear, it is these extra-textual 
exercises that are most prone to be forgotten. I contend that 
Schelling’s relative neglect of them in his analysis of Böhme’s 
mysticism gives rise to some of the instability in his attitude to 
theosophy during the 1830s and 40s, while his metaphilosophical 
reflections in Clara (with Swedenborg as exemplar) give rise to a 
more fruitful idea of the life the philosopher must live to become 
speculative. 
 
2. BECOMING-SPECULATIVE: HEGEL AND SCHELLING’S COMMON 
PROJECT 
When embarking on his Naturphilosophie in 1797, Schelling 
saw speculation as a sickness, a by-product of man’s sentimental 
alienation from nature: 
 
Mere speculation, therefore, is a spiritual sickness in 
mankind, and moreover the most dangerous of all, 
which kills the germ of man’s existence and uproots his 
being . . . Every weapon is justifiable against a 
philosophy which makes speculation not a means but an 
end. For it torments human reason with chimeras which, 
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because they lie beyond all reason, it is not even possible 
to combat. It makes that separation between man and 
the world permanent.7 
 
One speculates only when cast adrift. The task of the philosopher 
is thus the annihilation of speculation, which is also the 
annihilation of philosophy itself (and ultimately consciousness). 
Very quickly, however, Schelling found himself dissatisfied with 
such terminology and by 1799 “speculation” gained a very 
different valence: it became the ideal towards which 
Naturphilosophie moved—the perfection of this branch of the 
philosophical enterprise is dubbed a “speculative physics.”8 At the 
same time, Schelling begins to formulate more determinately a 
form of philosophising opposed to speculation, one that embodies 
all that is wrong with how we usually think—“reflection.” Reflection 
is the abject other of speculation, and it is the former rather than 
the latter that now designates a spiritual sickness in which the 
subject is alienated from the object, preventing secure knowledge. 
Hence, the 1803 edition of the Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature 
exactly inverts the 1797 passage: 
 
As soon as man sets himself in opposition to the external 
world. . . reflection first begins; he separates from now 
on what nature had always united, separates the object 
from the intuition, the concept from the image, finally 
himself from himself . . . Mere reflection, therefore, is a 
spiritual sickness in mankind, the more so when it 
imposes himself in dominion over the whole man, and 
kills at the root what in germ is his highest being, his 
spiritual life, which issues only from identity.9 
 
                                                                                                              
7 F.W.J. Schelling, Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature, trans. Errol E. Harris and 
Peter Heath (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 11. The 
1797 variant is printed in a footnote. 
8 F.W.J. Schelling, Introduction to the System of a Philosophy of Nature in First 
Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature, trans. Keith R. Peterson 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 2004), 195. 
9 Schelling, Ideas, 10-11. For a detailed account of the above, see Klaus 
Düsing, “Spekulation und Reflexion: Zur Gesammenarbeit Schellings und 
Hegels in Jena,” in Hegel-Studien 5 (1969). 
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At the turn of the century, the conceptual pairing 
reflection/speculation orientated Schelling’s approach to 
philosophy. Nevertheless, the idea of speculation and its relation to 
reflection remains underdetermined in Schelling’s writings10—until, 
that is, the Spring of 1801 and the arrival of Hegel in Jena as a 
collaborative partner. A more substantial conception of the 
reflection/speculation binary seems to have emerged in 
conversation; it is first hinted at in Schelling’s Presentation published 
in May 1801;11 then fully elaborated in Hegel’s Differenzschrift 
released in September. 
Initially at least, speculation and reflection are to be 
understood as opposed: “Since, for speculation, cognition has 
reality only within the absolute, what is cognised and known in the 
reflective mode of expression and therefore has a determinate 
form, becomes nothing in the presence of speculation.”12 
Speculating is equated with doing philosophy well and getting at 
the truth; reflective thought plunges into error. It is a sickness to be 
cured with the medicine of the speculative standpoint. Moreover, 
first and foremost, this sickness takes the form of narcissism. In 
reflection, “I remain entirely self-obsessed . . . I never get away 
from myself,” never “leave the circle of consciousness.”13 The 
mirror-image shows no more than what was present to begin with—
and usually rather less. A reflective philosopher therefore becomes 
trapped in the continual repetition of the same—an “inevitable 
vicious circle”14 of sterile limitation: “In its striving to enlarge itself 
                                                                                                              
10 See Düsing, “Spekulation und Reflexion,” 116. 
11 In the Preface, Schelling employs “speculation” positively (F.W.J. 
Schelling, Presentation of my System of Philosophy, trans. Michael G. Vater in 
Philosophical Forum 32.4 [2001], 346) and denigrates “the standpoint of 
reflection,” associating it with thinking from antitheses (ibid., 348) and 
Fichtean idealism (ibid., 345). In the main body of the work, he goes on to 
contrast what is “for reflection or in appearance” with “the standpoint of 
reason” (ibid., 351). 
12 G.W.F. Hegel, The Difference between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of 
Philosophy, trans. H.S. Harris and Walter Cerf (Albany: SUNY Press, 
1977), 99. 
13 F.W.J. Schelling, Werke, vol. 4, ed. K.F.A. Schelling (Stuttgart: Cotta, 
1856-61), 81. 
14 Ibid. 
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into the absolute, the intellect only reproduces itself ad infinitum 
and so mocks itself.”15 
 On the other hand, the speculative mirror breaks out of the 
vicious, nihilistic circle of reflection. It gains access to “the great 
outdoors” behind the looking-glass—and it is to this extent, of 
course, that the mirror is, as Schelling calls it, “magical.” What is 
reflected in the speculative mirror is not just the philosopher gazing 
in, but the totality of reality. But this is already to implicitly 
question the possibility of such a speculative mirror: is such a 
mirror “magical” because it is in fact a phantasy of intellectual 
desire? Is there any way to silver a mirror such that it would do 
what Schelling and Hegel hope for? Put simply, how is speculation 
to be achieved? Schelling and Hegel’s early answer runs as follows: 
the great outdoors is not to be accessed by smashing through the 
glass, but instead through radicalising the mirror’s limitations, its 
ineluctable insistence on reflecting back the same.16 There is no 
immediate path to speculation: it is to be captured by diversions, 
strategies and feints. Out of such concerns emerges the ideal of 
“mediated immediacy”—and, as this paper proceeds, a very 
Schellingian variant of such mediated immediacy will emerge: an 
art of speculation. 
 
Reflection is defined by dichotomy. “Reflection works only from 
oppositions and rests on oppositions.”17 In particular, the reflective 
mirror is that which distinguishes original from image. In so doing, 
it establishes a hierarchy between the two: the original becomes 
conceived as ontologically prior to the image and so the cause of 
the latter. It is here that Hegel and Schelling pinpoint the genesis of 
cause and effect and the type of mechanical thinking that is based 
upon them—“an eternal and flowing source of error.”18 Speculation 
rejects all these dichotomies and hierarchies by asserting the 
ultimate identity of original and image. As Hegel categorically 
states it, “the principle of speculation is the identity of subject and 
                                                                                                              
15 Hegel, Difference, 89-90. 
16 Hence Meillassoux criticises Hegel and Schelling for not breaking out of 
the correlation, but absolutising it. The great outdoors becomes the “great” 
indoors in a theorisation of total immanence. See Quentin Meillassoux, 
After Finitude, trans. Ray Brassier (London: Continuum, 2009), 37-8. 
17 Schelling, Presentation, 348. 
18 Schelling, Werke, 4:343-4. 
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object.”19 No duality emerges; instead, there is a sort of 
participatory metaphysics in which each image is reality in a 
specific form—and the aggregate of such images presents the 
absolute, the totality of reality: 
 
Reason does not recall its appearance, which emanates 
from it as a duplicate, back into itself—for then, it would 
only nullify it. Rather, reason constructs itself in its 
emanation as an identity that is conditioned by this very 
duplicate; it opposes this relative identity to itself once 
more, and in this way the system advances until the 
objective totality is completed. Reason then unites this 
objective totality with the opposite subjective totality to 
form the infinite world intuition, whose expansion has at 
the same time contracted into the richest and simplest 
identity.20 
  
Such a process of gathering together constitutes speculation itself, 
for all of reality now appears to the philosopher in her self-forged, 
magical mirror. 
 Three aspects of this programme for becoming-speculative 
require note. First, speculation is to be distinguished from 
reflection in terms of its achievement of totality. Speculation 
“carries totality within itself”21 in contrast to the “arbitrary 
separation of the individual from the whole effected by 
reflection.”22 As a collection of all possible images of the absolute, 
the speculative text is nothing less than the absolute itself. 
Speculation is all-encompassing: nothing is left out—not even, as we 
shall see, ghost stories and angelic realms.23 
 Second, the identity of the original with its image is once 
again mediated, rather than immediate. This is “the identity of 
identity and non-identity” proclaimed by Hegel in the 
                                                                                                              
19 Hegel, Difference, 80. 
20 Ibid., 113. 
21 Ibid., 89. 
22 Schelling, Presentation, 357. 
23 C.f. Grant’s conception of an “extensity test” for an absolute system. Iain 
Hamilton Grant, Philosophies of Nature after Schelling (London: Continuum, 
2006), 19-21. 
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Differenzschrift and Schelling in Bruno and the Further Presentations.24 
On the one hand, reflective thinking fixates on one particular 
image, thereby implicitly affirming the non-identity of such an 
image with reality as a whole. Here, “nonidentity is raised to an 
absolute principle.”25 On the other hand, the speculative 
philosopher is able to raise herself to totality so as to incorporate 
the particular image into a system. Speculation is only achieved by 
means of progressive systematisation.26 
 Third, this emphasis on the multiplicity of images in 
speculation (as opposed to reflective thinking’s fixation on one) is 
of a piece with siding with life over death. The reflective 
understanding kills, because it places all phenomena in “static, 
dead pigeonholes;”27 speculative reason, however, gives rise to life, 
since it describes a process of becoming.28 What is seemingly 
forgotten, though, in Hegel and Schelling’s early assertions on the 
supremacy of life is the necessity of mediation. The affirmation of 
life needs to be mediated through its opposite, death, and in Part 
Four of this paper I will reconstruct Schelling’s argument that 
death (or the philosophical simulation of suicide) is a precondition 
for speculative philosophising. 
 
                                                                                                              
24 Hegel, Difference, 156; F.W.J. Schelling, Bruno, or On the Natural and 
Divine Principle in Things, trans. Michael G. Vater (Albany: SUNY Press, 
1984), 192; Schelling, Werke, 4:431. 
25 Hegel, Difference, 81. See Gasché, The Tain of the Mirror, 26. 
26 For Hegel, this achievement is reflection's own doing – it negates itself by 
pursuing its own end absolutely. Reflection “has thrown itself into the 
abyss of its own perfection” (Difference, 140), he writes, and thereby 
becomes “speculative reflection” (ibid., 174), so that “philosophy [is] a 
totality of knowledge produced by reflection” (ibid., 103). For Hegel, 
therefore, speculation and reflection are not ultimately as opposed as they 
first appear. This is one of the points at which Schelling and Hegel 
diverge: for Schelling, reflection has “only negative value” (Schelling, Ideas, 
11). 
27 Hegel, Difference, 80. 
28 Ibid., 91. See also the language of life and death in G.W.F. Hegel and 
F.W.J. Schelling, “The Critical Journal of Philosophy: Introduction on the 
Essence of Philosophical Criticism Generally and its Relationship to the 
Present State of Philosophy in Particular,” in George di Giovanni and H.S. 
Harris (eds.), Between Kant and Hegel: Texts in the Development of Post-Kantian 
Idealism (Albany: SUNY Press, 1985). 
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Such—broadly—are the features of speculation and reflection as they 
emerge in Schelling and Hegel’s writings at the turn of the 
nineteenth century. However, so far I have said very little, for it is 
difficult to see at first blush how the above connects with concrete 
philosophical practice. What does it mean, for example, for the 
philosopher to posit the identity of original and image? What 
would this look like in a philosophical text? It is at this point that a 
plurality of interpretations accumulates. It is precisely here that the 
endeavour to silver a speculative mirror becomes a matter of 
experimentation. In what follows, I pursue two such experiments 
from later in Schelling’s career in which he attempts to make 
clearer what speculative silvering might look like—and, in 
particular, what exactly the philosophical art of mediating to 
produce immediacy might consist in. At stake, therefore, are rules 
for the construction of good philosophy—and it is at this point that 
the role of the mystical text in German Idealism takes centre-stage. 
 
3. THE ART OF IMMEDIACY: WHERE BÖHME WENT WRONG 
The mystic most often associated with Schelling’s philosophy 
is Jakob Böhme—and and it is certainly true that Schelling’s 
engagement with his work was long, intense and eventful. Schelling 
was introduced to Böhme by Tieck in 1799; he obtained a copy of 
his works in 1804 and became infatuated by him by 1809.29 As 
Cyril O’Regan puts it of the period around 1809, “many of 
Schelling’s texts read almost as if they are paraphrases of 
Böhme.”30 Böhme is the Muse of the middle period, even if 
between 1807 and 1820 Schelling never once mentions his name.31 
In what follows, however, I consider the return Schelling makes to 
                                                                                                              
29 On the context of Schelling’s early reading of Böhme, see Paola Mayer, 
Jena Romanticism and its Appropriation of Böhme (Montreal: McGill 
University Press, 1999). 
30 Cyril O’Regan, The Heterodox Hegel (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994), 462. 
31 This makes the task of assessing the extent of Böhme’s influence 
particularly difficult. In the Anglo-American literature, Robert Brown’s The 
Later Philosophy of Schelling: The Influence of Böhme on Schelling’s Works of 
1809-15 (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1977) affirms Böhme’s 
influence enthusiastically. In Germany, however, the 1970s saw a reaction 
against the Böhmean Schelling: Harold Holz, Spekulation und Faktizitat: 
Zum Freiheitsbegriff in des mittleren und späten Schelling (Bonn: Bouvier, 1970); 
Werner Beierwaltes, Platonismus und Idealismus (Frankfurt am Main: 
Klostermann, 1972). 
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Böhme’s work at a much later date in his career—the 1830s and 
40s. Here, rather than talking like Böhme, Schelling talks about him, 
and, what is more, he talks about Böhme’s work in terms of the 
very kind of mediated immediacy that had been set out as the goal 
of speculative thought as far back as 1801. 
 The 1841/42 Lectures on the Philosophy of Revelation were to be 
the crowning achievement of Schelling’s career. In Summer 1841, 
the King of Prussia summoned Schelling to Berlin to slay “the 
legions sprung from the teeth of Hegel’s pantheistic dragon” (as the 
King’s own letter put it)32—and the Lectures were the immediate 
result. They opened with a who’s-who of nineteenth-century 
intellectuals in attendance (Bakunin, Burkhardt, Engels, Alexander 
von Humboldt, Kierkegaard, Ranke, Savigny, Trendelenburg), but 
ended heaped in derision. Indeed, H.E.G. Paulus published a 
pirated edition of the lectures for the very purpose of ridiculing 
them.33 In supplementary footnotes, Paulus berates Schellingian 
positive philosophy as succumbing to the worst excesses of 
theosophy—implicitly linking Schelling’s name to Böhme’s once 
more.34 
Schelling had a twofold response to Paulus’s piracy: first, to 
sue him; second, to add a new section to the lectures determining 
his relation to Böhmean theosophy more precisely. Hence, the 
Lectures on the Philosophy of Revelation of 1842/43 include an 
additional lecture which explicitly picks up on the accusations: 
“Have I myself not provided the impetus to bring positive 
philosophy into contact with theosophy?”35 
                                                                                                              
32 Quoted in Alan White, Schelling: An Introduction to the System of Freedom 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 146. 
33 Republished (without Paulus’ editorial interjections) as F.W.J. Schelling, 
Philosophie der Offenbarung 1841/42, ed. Manfred Frank (Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp, 1977). For accounts of the Paulus-affair, see Frank, 
“Einleitung” to ibid., 46-52; Xavier Tilliette, Schelling: Biographie (Paris: 
Calmann-Lévy, 1999), 351, 354-7. 
34 Bakunin, Engels, Leroux and Ruge also commented on Schelling’s 
proximity to theosophy. See the extracts in Schelling, Philosophie der 
Offenbarung 1841/42, 542, 546, 552. For Engels, see his “Anti-Schelling” 
(http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1841/anti-
schelling/index.htm; last accessed: 09/12/12), passim. 
35 F.W.J. Schelling, The Grounding of Positive Philosophy: The Berlin Lectures, 
trans. Bruce Matthews (Albany: SUNY Press, 2007), 174. 
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 There is much in Schelling’s reading of Böhme that reflects 
standard philosophical prejudices against mysticism. A glance at 
Schelling’s treatment of Böhmean theosophy in his 1833 Lectures on 
the History of Modern Philosophy makes this “standard” attitude most 
clear. Here theosophers, like Böhme, are characterised as 
“philosophers of not-knowing”36: instead of argument, they employ 
“ecstatic intuition and immediate revelation.”37 In this state of 
immediate ecstasy, “language and knowledge cease” and “all 
communication of knowledge [becomes] impossible.”38 Such is the 
problem of articulation that plagues mystical thinking: the very 
immediacy of the experience of God which is the mystic’s greatest 
asset becomes her downfall when it comes to communicating this 
experience—or even preserving it in clear concepts. Mystical 
experience is incapable of the mediation appropriate to 
articulation. As Schelling puts it, “all experience, feeling, vision is 
in itself mute and needs a mediating organ to be expressed.”39 For 
the theosopher, though, mediation is conceived as an external, 
destructive agent which pollutes the privileged experience with 
which she began. In consequence, Schelling concludes, “the true 
mark of mysticism is the hatred of clear knowledge.”40 Böhme and 
other theosophists fail to attain the speculative ideal of the 
indifference of mediacy and immediacy—and hence, it is no 
surprise that Schelling criticises them by returning to mirror 
imagery: they do not “place [experience] firmly before [them] . . . 
to look at it in the understanding as in a mirror (in reflection).”41 
The speculative philosopher, on the other hand, realises the 
following: 
 
Everything . . . must first be brought to real reflection, in 
order to achieve the highest representation. Here, then, 
lies the border between theosophy and philosophy 
which the lover of science will chastely seek to preserve, 
                                                                                                              
36 F.W.J. Schelling, On the History of Modern Philosophy, trans. Andrew 
Bowie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 179. 
37 Ibid., 181. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid., 185. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid., 181. 
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without being led astray by the apparent wealth of the 
material in the theosophical systems.42 
 
The philosopher must not run scared of mirrors as the theosopher 
does. 
 
When Schelling returns to Böhme once more in the 1842/43 
Lectures on the Philosophy of Revelation, such a critique still plays its 
part, but something very different is now going on as well. A sense 
of Schelling’s new project of positive philosophy is required to 
discern this. 
The task of the Lectures on the Philosophy of Revelation is to 
obtain knowledge of the divine as actually existing (i.e. as 
historically, rather than logically becoming). In other words, the 
requirement is to cultivate a state of rational ecstasy where God is 
encountered not as a concept of thought, but as a freely acting 
person. Positive philosophy leaves behind a philosophy of logic for 
a philosophy of existence, of freedom and of life. Thus on the one 
hand, Schelling mounts a critique of all previous philosophy as too 
rationalistic. Such philosophy has possessed no relation to concrete 
existence in the world: “Rational philosophy . . . is so independent 
of existence that it would be true even if nothing existed.”43 Hegel 
is of course the target of this attack. His system, Schelling claims, 
remains stuck within thought: it is “empty, logical” and “an 
unbridgeable chasm [separates] logical necessity and reality.”44 
And so, on the other hand, Schelling attempts to set out the 
method for a non-logical philosophy, one that does access concrete 
being and so escapes the confines of thought. This philosophy does 
not begin in thought but outside it. Positive philosophy thus 
demands that reason be “set outside itself, absolutely ecstatic”45; it 
demands that reason “become motionless, paralysed . . . in order 
that through this subordination reason may reach its true and 
eternal content.”46 And this true content is “extralogical 
existence.”47 
                                                                                                              
42 Ibid., 182. 
43 Schelling, The Berlin Lectures, 179-80. 
44 Ibid., 160. 
45 Ibid., 203. 
46 Ibid., 205-6. 
47 Ibid., 155. 
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It should be obvious how and why Böhmean theosophy could 
serve as a useful guide here. Böhme’s visions of the divine make 
claim to the same kind of ecstasis as positive philosophy. They 
assume immediate access to the processes God actually undergoes, 
free of the dross of scholastic metaphysics. Böhmean mysticism 
accesses the divine through apparently immediate experience. 
Schelling’s characterisation of Böhmean thought in the 1842/43 
Lectures recognises this, 
 
In a third type of empiricism, the supersensible is made 
into an object of actual experience through which a 
possible ecstasy of the human essence in God is 
assumed, the consequence of which is a necessary, 
infallible vision not merely into the divine essence, but 
into the essence of creation and every phase of that 
process as well. This type of empiricism is theosophy, 
which is predominantly a speculative or theoretical 
mysticism.48 
 
Böhme’s writings exhibit “the inherently laudable aspiration to 
comprehend the emergence of things from God as an actual chain 
of events.”49 
 
And yet, while the aspiration may be there, Schelling contends that 
Böhme ultimately fails to fulfill it. Here the standard German 
Idealist critique of mysticism continues to play its part (Böhme 
lacks a rigorous method and so is plagued by the problem of 
articulation), but it is now obviously insufficient—for the aim of 
positive philosophy is precisely to throw off the burden of scientific 
rigour in the name of ecstasy. Schelling now seems to want to be a 
mystic. As such, his most substantial criticisms end up proceeding 
in a very different direction. 
 Namely, Böhme fails to encounter God as actual in ecstasy 
because he remains in thrall to logic and rationalism. Böhme is still 
too scientific, too philosophical. Despite its appearance to the 
contrary, Böhme’s vision of God is too mediated to serve as a model 
for Schellingian positive philosophy:  
 
                                                                                                              
48 Ibid., 173. 
49 Ibid., 175. 
WHISTLER – SILVERING 
165 
We have advanced theosophy primarily as the antithesis 
of rational philosophy, and thus of rationalism in 
philosophy. Yet at bottom theosophy strives to move 
beyond rationalism without, however, being capable of 
actually wresting away rationalism’s substantial 
knowledge. . . Theosophy wants of course to overcome 
such a knowledge, but it does not succeed, as is seen 
most clearly with Böhme. . . Although he calls it 
theosophy, thus making the claim to be the science of the 
divine, the content to which theosophy attains remains 
only a substantial movement, and he presents God only 
in a substantial movement.50 
 
What separates theosophy from positive philosophy, Schelling now 
contends, is the remnant of abstract logical thought in theosophical 
speculation: 
 
What in particular lies at the heart of Jakob Böhme’s 
theosophy is the inherently laudable aspiration to 
comprehend the emergence of things from God as an 
actual chain of events. Jakob Böhme, however, does not 
know of any other way to bring this about than by 
invoking the deity itself in a type of natural process. The 
characteristic feature of the positive philosophy, however, 
consists precisely in that it rejects all processes taken in 
this sense, namely in which God would not only be the 
logical but also the actual result of a process. To this 
extent, the positive philosophy is more properly 
speaking in direct opposition with each and every 
theosophical aspiration.51 
 
The question is therefore why Böhme fails to escape thought, logic 
and rationalism. And Schelling’s answer is basically Kantian: 
Böhme wants an immediate experience of God, but no experience 
of the divine can ever be immediate. There is no “raw,” naïve or 
immediate experience of an external entity and so Böhme’s raid on 
immediacy must necessarily—even if surreptitiously—involve 
mediacy. It is Böhme’s appeal to experience which is the problem, 
                                                                                                              
50 Ibid., 177. 
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because experience, Schelling insists, can never resist entirely the 
activity of reason. Experience is ineluctably logical, and so the 
mystic remains forever alienated from the actuality of the 
theogonic process, consigned to a merely conceptual vision of this 
genesis. Böhme’s claim to “immediate experience” still smuggles in 
mediacy. 
 
So, Schelling contends, a different method is required than that 
which mystics employ. Ecstasis must be cultivated in a different 
way, a way that avoids appeal to experience. Philosophy must 
therefore begin from what exceeds or what is above experience, with “a 
being that is absolutely external to thought . . . beyond all 
experience as it is before all thought.”52 However, of course, for a 
Kantian (like the late Schelling), what is outside the realm of 
possible experience is inaccessible to the human subject. In 
consequence, indirection is required to bring about human access to 
what exceeds experience. In other words, Schelling develops an art 
of ecstasy: in place of the mystic’s blunt, direct appeal to immediacy, 
he develops a strategic approach to the transcendent. The 
immediate is not (pace Böhme) immediately available, rather it is 
only to be obtained as a result of the mediacy of feints and 
diversions. 
 In 1833, the speculative mirror was invoked as a means of 
making experience conceptual: only when immediate experience 
reflects itself in a mirror can it attain true rigour and be labelled 
knowledge. In 1842, Schelling appeals to this mirror once again; 
however, it is for precisely the opposite reason: mediation is no 
longer a way of transforming vision into thought, but of escaping 
thought into vision. The speculative mirror is invoked for the sake 
of the unthought. An immediate vision of God as he actually is is 
only available via mediation. 
 To return to the terms of my Introduction, the immediacy of 
the mystic vision is to be safeguarded by posterior exercises in 
mediation. But, of course, in the terms of my Introduction, this is 
still to uphold something like an idealist fiction in which the initial 
moment of vision is still given immediately. That is, in his writings 
on Böhme (both On the History of Modern Philosophy and Lectures on 
the Philosophy of Revelation), Schelling neglects the mediation 
necessary to obtain that moment of vision to begin with. He 
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neglects those crucial exercises that transform the mystic into a 
person able to have such visions. The genesis of the mystical form 
of life eludes him. A symptom of this can be located in Schelling’s 
violent oscillations between conceiving Böhme as a fanatic (On the 
History of Modern Philosophy) and as a Hegelian (Lectures on the 
Philosophy of Revelation). To even attempt to position mysticism 
stably on the rational/irrational axis might itself seem misplaced53; 
granting its possibility, however, such positioning still assumes too 
much—namely, that the rationality of Böhme’s mystical texts can be 
classified with respect to two components alone: (a) the immediacy 
of his visions and (b) the problem of articulation attendant upon 
subsequently describing them. What is missing here is any account 
of the processes by which the visions are themselves generated and 
the implications of that for positioning Böhme on the 
rational/irrational axis. 
To see what such an account might in fact looks like, as well 
as its significance for both Schelling’s encounter with mysticism 
and his own characterisation of speculation, one must turn to Clara.  
 
4. SIMULATING SUICIDE WITH CLARA 
Emanuel Swedenborg’s Heaven and Hell opens as a project in 
scriptural exegesis. In the Preface, Swedenborg rails against those 
who understand the words of Scripture merely “according to their 
literal meaning.”54 The genuinely religious act of reading goes 
beyond literalism to plumb “the hidden depths that lie within the 
details of the Word.”55 There is a spiritual meaning as well—and the 
purpose of Heaven and Hell, according to Swedenborg in these first 
                                                                                                              
53 Indeed, this is a problem to which philosophy in general is often prone 
insofar as it attempts to circumscribe the nonphilosophical by means of its 
own categories. Mysticism is a particularly helpful example by which to 
disrupt philosophy’s treatment of the nonphilosophical precisely because 
of the prevalence of mysticisms that either seem to call for multiple loci on 
the axis (e.g. medieval speculative mysticism, employing rigorous logic for 
an apophatic end) or resist the terms of the axis altogether (e.g. Islamic 
theoretical gnosis). On the latter example, see Seyyed Hossein Nasr, 
“Theoretical Gnosis, Doctrinal Sufism and their Significance Today” in 
Transcendent Philosophy 6 (2005). 
54 Emanuel Swedenborg, Heaven and Hell: Drawn from Things Heard and 
Seen, trans. George F. Dole (West Chester, PA: Swedenborg Foundation, 
2000), 87. 
55 Ibid., 87. 
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few pages, is to reveal this spiritual significance and so make us 
better readers. Yet, there immediately arises a skeptical rejoinder 
to this project: why should we trust Swedenborg? What guarantees 
his dogmatic assertion of these “pure correspondences” hidden in 
the biblical text for which “every detail points to something 
spiritual”56? The answer is given casually, in passing almost: 
Swedenborg is so sure because he has been granted immediate 
experience of the spirit world of heaven and hell: “I have also been 
enabled to see what is in heaven and in hell, a process that has 
been going on for thirteen years. Now I am being allowed 
therefore to describe what I have heard and seen.”57 There is no 
doubting the correspondences in the Bible, for they are confirmed 
by what Swedenborg has seen with his own eyes. This passing 
remark reorients the whole project of Heaven and Hell: only 
minimally an exercise in scriptural hermeneutics, it is rather 
dominated by accounts of Swedenborg’s discussions with angels 
and observations of heaven’s geography. For example, he famously 
gives the following description of angelic town-planning: 
 
Whenever I have talked with angels face to face, I have 
been with them in their houses. Their houses were just 
like the houses on earth that we call homes, but more 
beautiful. They have chambers, suites, and bedrooms in 
abundance and courtyards with gardens, flowerbeds, and 
lawns around them. Where there is some concentration 
of people, the houses are adjoining, one near another, 
arranged in the form of a city with streets and lanes and 
public squares, just like the ones we see in cities on earth. 
I have been allowed to stroll along them and look 
around wherever I wished, at times entering people’s 
homes. This has happened when I was fully awake, with 
my inner sight opened.58 
 
 What is most significant for present purposes is Swedenborg’s 
attempt in the Preface to Heaven and Hell (and this is illustrative of 
his whole oeuvre) to present his project as both hermeneutically 
sophisticated and empirically naïve. The accounts he puts forward 
                                                                                                              
56 Ibid., 88. 
57 Ibid., 89; my emphasis. 
58 Ibid., 181-2. 
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arise from both a delicate process of textual archaeology and a 
simple act of sensing what is immediately accessible. 
Swedenborgian mysticism partakes in both immediacy and 
mediacy; indeed, I want to contend in what follows that at one 
moment in his philosophical trajectory Swedenborgian mysticism 
represents for Schelling an ideal, precisely owing to the 
indifference of immediacy and mediacy productive of the 
speculative standpoint. Swedenborg attains immediate access to the 
great outdoors of the spirit world without succumbing to the 
theosophical temptation to silence and the renunciation of 
language. 
 
Schelling’s unfinished novel, Clara, is haunted by Swedenborg’s 
achievements. Indeed, it ends with an exposition of “the northern 
visionary’s” doctrine of revelation—an exposition which leaves the 
characters with a warm glow of “the greatest joy.”59 What is more, 
the very climax of the third dialogue—the novel’s heart and 
ground—makes reference to Swedenborg once again:  
 
Truly anyone who dared to speak authoritatively about 
this [spirit] world would have to have died and come 
back to this life from the other side, like Plato’s 
Armenian, or must have had his inner being opened to 
him in some other way so that he could look into that 
world, as happened to that Swedish visionary.60 
 
Swedenborg is here presented as an ideal figure, since he achieved 
the near-impossible: he experienced the spirit world without 
having to die (as is the case for most of us, even Plato’s Armenian) 
without even (and this will become increasingly important) falling 
asleep or being hypnotised. Swedenborg saw the heavens “when I 
was fully awake, with my inner sight opened.”61 
 For the Schelling of Clara, this is the very condition to which 
the philosopher aspires. The spirit world is that aspect of reality in 
                                                                                                              
59 F.W.J. Schelling, Clara or, On Nature’s Connection to the Spirit World, trans. 
Fiona Steinkamp (Albany: SUNY Press, 2002), 77. 
60 Ibid., 55-6. 
61 For a more general exploration of Schelling’s appropriation of 
Swedenborg, see Friedemann Horn, Schelling and Swedenborg: Mysticism and 
German Idealism, trans. George F. Dole (West Chester, PA: Swedenborg 
Foundation, 1997). 
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which the ideal potency (the potency of mind, the ethical and the 
religious) is at its most intense.62 To fulfill the speculative aim of 
philosophically accounting for everything (thereby bringing the 
system to totality), the spirit world must be included as well. 
Philosophers need to provide accounts of the spirit world, like 
Swedenborg—and ideally philosophers would provide such 
accounts based on an immediate experience that can be clearly 
articulated without falsification, again like Swedenborg. The task 
for philosophers is, then, to become Swedenborg. 
 Hence, the whole of Clara is oriented around this problem: 
how can the living (and, in particular, living philosophers) come to 
know the spirit world? The model of death is one particularly 
powerful answer given throughout the novel, since dying is, of 
course, the most popular means of attaining access to this realm of 
reality.63 What is at stake for an absolute philosophy that accounts 
for the spirit world is the simulation of death (achieving precisely 
what death does but while conscious). As Schelling puts it, “He 
who loves wisdom will work towards death even here.”64 So, each 
of the five dialogues in Clara sets out conditions for the 
accomplishment of the Swedenborgian ideal—that is, practical ways 
to die in life and so imitate the mystical text. 
 The first dialogue, for instance, interrogates the possibilities 
and dangers of organised religion for this end. Clara opens with a 
presentation of Catholic festivities on All Souls Day as a symbolic 
means of communing with the dead:  
 
We saw a crowd of people thronging toward a gentle 
incline . . . We joined them so that for once we, too, 
could watch the moving festival dedicated to the dead 
that is celebrated this day in Catholic towns. We found 
the whole area full of people already. It was peculiar to 
see life on the graves, forebodingly illuminated by the 
                                                                                                              
62 See Schelling, Clara, 79. 
63 One of the central arguments of Clara is that death is not a negative 
moment, but “an elevation into a higher potency, into a really different 
and higher world” (ibid., 46). See further ibid., 79. C.f. Deleuze, Cinema II: 
The Time-Image: “Philosophers are beings who have passed through a 
death, who are born from it . . . The philosopher has returned from the 
dead and goes back there” (trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta 
[London: Athlone, 1999], 208-9). 
64 Ibid., 44. 
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dully shining autumn sun. As we left the trodden path, 
we soon saw pretty groups gathered around individual 
graves: here girls in their bloom, holding hands with 
their younger brothers and sisters, crowned their 
mother’s grave; there at the grave of her children lost so 
young a mother stood in silence with no need for 
consecrated water to represent her tears . . . Here all of 
life’s severed relationships were revived for the 
spectators who were familiar with the people and the 
circumstances; brothers came again to brothers and 
children to parents; at this moment all were one family 
again.65 
 
Schelling’s interest in the philosophical potentialities of the 
religious community was long-standing: his lectures on the 
Philosophy of Art end with an invocation of religious festivity.66 And 
here again we read Schelling posit from the very beginning of 
Clara communal celebration as a means of attaining access to the 
spirit world. In a proto-Bakhtinian (but also very non-Bakhtinian!) 
manner, the festival becomes a site for the revelation of truth. 
 But it is seemingly not for everyone: none of the characters in 
the dialogue feel able to immerse themselves in the festival. The 
priest and doctor merely watch, while Clara has shut herself away 
in a Benedictine monastery. Such behaviour exemplifies what is, 
for Schelling, the other, equally prevalent face of organised 
religion: ascesis. Religion often prescribes collective immersion in 
the name of truth, but often it prescribes solitary withdrawal—and 
Schelling is insistent that such ascetic withdrawal from the world 
(whether physical in Clara’s case or intellectual in the case of the 
idealist philosopher) is precisely what impedes access to the spirit 
world. Ascesis is the danger which must be avoided. Such dangers 
are embodied in the “well-educated, young clergyman”67 who 
                                                                                                              
65 Ibid., 9. 
66 “Music, song, dance, as well as all the various types of drama, live only 
in public life, and form an alliance in such life. Wherever public life 
disappears, instead of that real, external drama in which, in all its forms, 
an entire people participates as a political or moral totality, only an inward, 
ideal drama can unite the people. This ideal drama is the worship service, 
the only kind of truly public action that has remained for the contemporary 
age” (Schelling, Philosophy of Art, 280). See also Schelling, Werke, 6:573. 
67 Schelling, Clara, 10. 
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appears in this opening dialogue: his disconnection from the world 
and subsequent inability to recognise any positive connection 
between it and the next results in disparaging comments on the 
festival and ultimately in a sterile, pseudo-Kantian agnosticism. So, 
when the narrator comments, “We should support all festivals and 
customs in which we are reminded of a connection with the world 
beyond,” the clergyman responds:  
 
Today’s commemoration certainly has something 
moving about it; however, if its purpose is to support the 
thought that we can be connected to the inhabitants of 
that other world, then I would hold this commemoration 
to be one that is almost detrimental and I would submit 
that it be abolished in your church . . . We must honour 
these old divisions.68 
 
It is to such comments that Clara responds with the voice of both 
speculation and mysticism: “What do cold words and merely 
negative concepts have to do with ardent longing? Are we satisfied 
in this life with a bleak existence?”69 
An alternative is required, and this alternative must provide a 
means of accessing the spirit world without renouncing this one. It 
is with this aim in view that the discussion turns to philosophy as a 
form of worldly curiosity. Philosophising serves as an antidote to 
ascesis: “Merely exercising piety as a way of life, without combining 
it with lively and active scientific research, leads to emptiness.”70 
Indeed, this is a theme which resurfaces again and again in 
Schelling’s philosophy: knowledge of higher things (God, freedom, 
the mind) does not come at the expense of the lower. Schelling 
repeatedly berates those philosophical ascetics who indulge in 
ethereal but ultimately vacuous considerations of the spiritual. 
Hence, in the 1809 Freiheitsschrift he attacks “dreary and fanatic 
enthusiasm which breaks forth in self-mutilation or . . . in self-
emasculation” and “which in philosophy is accomplished by the 
                                                                                                              
68 Ibid., 12. The clergyman closely mimics Kant’s own assessment of 
speculative mysticism in the closing pages of Dreams of a Spirit-Seer (in 
Theoretical Philosophy 1755-1770, ed. and trans. David Walford 
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992], 2:367-73). On Schelling’s 
familiarity with Dreams, see Horn, Schelling and Swedenborg, 11. 
69 Ibid., 13. 
70 Ibid., 17. 
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renunciation of reason and science.”71 Similar sentiments are to be 
found in the Introduction to Clara as well: “Modern philosophy 
did away with its immediate reference to nature, or didn’t think to 
keep it, and proudly scorned any connection to physics. 
Continuing with its claims to the higher world, it was no longer 
metaphysics but hyperphysics.”72 
 This is also a theme emphasised in the second dialogue: 
becoming-Swedenborg (knowledge of the ideal in its highest 
potentiation) can only occur by way of the natural sciences. It is this 
point that the character of the doctor presses home to Clara, so as 
to counteract her flight to the monastery. Naturphilosophie is a 
necessary precondition for being a speculative philosopher. He 
begins in the first dialogue, “No one should devote themselves to 
this investigation [of the spirit world] until they have gained a firm 
and solid ground here, within nature, on which they can base their 
thoughts . . . Not ‘top down’ but ‘bottom up’ is my motto.”73 And 
he then continues in the second dialogue:  
 
They [the ascetics] start with what is most general and 
spiritual and are thereby never able to come down to 
reality or particulars. They are ashamed to start from the 
earth, to climb up from the creature as if from a rung on 
a ladder, to draw those thoughts that are beyond the 
senses first from earth, fire, water and air. And so they 
don’t get anywhere, either: their webs of thought are 
plants without roots, they don’t hang onto anything.74 
 
Knowledge of what is higher must be mediated (reflected) by what 
is lower. This is our first clue to Schelling’s philosophical 
reconstruction of the Swedenborgian mirror: it involves impurity—
the mixing of realms and sciences. As we shall see, this impurity 
informs the Schellingian definition of dialectic. 
Let me temporarily skip the third dialogue and turn to the final 
two. Here the problem of articulation that so worried Schelling 
                                                                                                              
71 F.W.J. Schelling, Philosophical Inquiries into the Nature of Human Freedom, 
trans. James Gutmann (La Salle: Open Court, 1936), 31. 
72 Schelling, Clara, 3. See further ibid., 4-5. Whether this introductory 
piece was actually intended as an introduction to Clara or not is a matter 
of debate (see Steinkamp’s notes to these passages). 
73 Ibid., 15. 
74 Ibid., 28. 
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with respect to Böhme takes centre-stage once again—that is, if the 
philosopher is able to attain experience of the spirit world by 
following the rules set out in the earlier dialogues, there remains 
the problem of transforming such immediate experience into 
knowledge and subsequently into a textual artefact. This is again to 
insist on indifferentiating between immediacy and mediacy to 
achieve the speculative standpoint: the philosopher attains the 
great outdoors only through mirroring it. Further practices and 
exercises must be prescribed for the philosopher to turn 
experience into cognition and text. 
 The fourth dialogue thus gives rules on the manufacture of a 
speculative text. This is of course somewhat of a performative 
exercise, since the rules Schelling sets out for the amelioration of 
philosophical writing are precisely those meant to be embodied in 
Clara itself. So, the fourth dialogue begins: 
 
At about the same time, a few days or weeks or so later, 
a philosophy book arrived in which some of the 
excellent things it contained were written in a completely 
incomprehensible language and abounded, so to speak, 
with barbarism. Clara found it on my table and after 
she’d read it for a while, she said: Why do today’s 
philosophers find it so impossible to write at least a little 
in the same way that they speak? Are these terribly 
artificial words absolutely necessary, can’t the same thing 
be said in a more natural way, and does a book have to 
be quite unenjoyable for it to be philosophical?75 
 
In place of this arid and alienating jargon, Clara and the priest 
agree that philosophical works should tend to “the language of the 
people” and even the language of the lover; they should be 
dialogues, dramatizing a debate to “make it live before our very 
eyes”; and they should respect the Aristotelian unity of action 
(something that Clara—as a novel—does not do).76 
 These rules are further grounded in a discussion of the nature 
of language in the fifth dialogue. Language itself possesses the 
potential for bearing witness to both the natural world and the 
spirit world, for it “contains a spiritual essence and a corporeal 
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element.”77 Language is both a physical entity (sound/graphic 
mark) and an ideal one (meaning): it oscillates between nature and 
spirit. Indeed, Schelling mentions examples where language has 
become the medium through which to attain occult experience of 
the spirit world:  
 
Certain strange cases that cannot be gainsaid are told of 
people in conditions of rapture coming to understand 
languages of which they had no prior knowledge, even 
of their coming to speak in other tongues, as the apostles 
once did. It would follow from this that in all languages, 
particularly in the original ones, something of the initial 
element’s purity is still to be found.78 
 
Such sentiments are repeated in the 1811 Report on Schmid’s Attempt 
at Pasigraphy where once again the depths of language are 
foregrounded as the key tool for an occult heightening of the self:  
 
We know of a quantity of cases where people in a 
somnambulant condition have produced poetry which 
they were never again able to produce in a wakeful state 
. . . In the Actis Naturae Curiosum there is the story of a 
woman who in the condition of pregnancy fell into an 
ecstasy in which she sang unknown songs and talked in 
foreign tongues . . . All this is surely sufficient to prove 
that the source of language lies in man and, like so much 
else which hides in him, emerges more freely under 
certain circumstances and is developed into a higher, 
more universal sense of language.79 
 
 Hence, language performs the very ideal of Schellingian 
speculation in Clara: it approaches the spirit world without 
renouncing the real and the natural. To speak is to deny the power 
of the ascetic ideal (and here emerges the germ of a critique of 
                                                                                                              
77 Ibid., 72. 
78 Ibid., 72-3. 
79 Schelling, Werke, 8:450-1. When we turn to the discussion of the occult 
in the third dialogue, this linguistic backdrop needs to be borne in mind. 
Language forms the basis of occult experience and the oscillation of the 
dialectic merely mirrors the oscillation of the word. 
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apophaticism). What is more, this account of the ontology of 
language also throws light on Schelling’s attack on artificial jargon 
in the fourth dialogue. The resources for good philosophy are 
already present in language as it is; there is no need to remould it 
in the scientific image. The linguistic barbarians attacked in the 
fourth dialogue are similar to the ascetics Schelling likewise 
condemns: both renounce the everyday and the real, thereby 
concealing, rather than revealing, the truth. The invention of a 
philosophical language is a redundant gesture; the language of the 
people already possesses speculative potential.80 Therefore, 
Schelling’s linguistic concerns are pragmatic: setting rules for the 
concrete situations in which language can best be employed and its 
potential mined. Specifically, the speculative ideal is effectuated in 
a language of sympathy, “a heavenly appearance even here”81 in 
which the materiality of the sign is not renounced but perfected.82 
And this incorporation of sympathy into the speculative should not 
surprise us, for speculation is the overcoming of opposition for 
identity—the very same dynamic exhibited by a sympathetic 
understanding. Sympathy—and in particular a sympathetic use of 
language—is the speculative affect par excellence.83 
 
It is in the third dialogue that the characters tackle the project of 
becoming-Swedenborg most explicitly. While the first two 
dialogues set out some general philosophical prerequisites for this 
end and the last two (posterior) practices for manufacturing a text 
that manages to capture experience of the spirit world in linguistic 
form, it is the third dialogue which directly takes on the challenge 
of specifying those pre-philosophical exercises by which a full 
                                                                                                              
80 In the contemporaneous Stuttgart Seminars, Schelling affirms the maxim, 
vox populi vox Dei. F.W.J. Schelling, Stuttgart Seminars in Idealism and the 
Endgame of Theory: Three Essays, ed. and trans. Thomas Pfau (Albany: 
SUNY Press, 1994), 237. 
81 Schelling, Clara, 72. 
82 So, Schelling speaks of “communication without signs via an invisible, 
but perhaps nevertheless physical, influence” (ibid., 73). And once again 
the amorous relation becomes a philosophical model. 
83 For more on the affect of sympathy in Schelling’s philosophy and its 
relation to his rhetorical practice, see Joshua Ramey and Daniel Whistler, 
“The Physics of Sense: Bruno, Schelling, Deleuze” in Gilles Deleuze and 
Metaphysics, eds. Alain Beaulieu, Edward Kazarian and Julia Sushytska 
(Lexington, MA: Lexington, 2013), 95-6. 
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experience of the spirit world is made possible. Moreover, as I 
have already intimated, the characters realise that such exercises 
must be modelled on death, for it is through dying that this spirit 
world is typically reached. Speculative philosophers must simulate 
suicide to know all of reality—and the third dialogue sets about 
identifying how. Such a concern with suicide should not be read as 
a “mystic aberration” in Schelling’s trajectory. An insistence on 
killing the self in order to philosophise is a recurrent one in his 
oeuvre. For example, it is crucial to the methodology of 
Naturphilosophie: the process of abstraction by which philosophy 
begins consists in an artificial annihilation of the conscious self: “I 
had to extract the I from its own intuition . . . to posit the I as 
unconscious; but the I, to the extent it is unconscious, is not = the 
I.”84 The philosopher must suppress the I to know nature, and it is 
only a short step from asserting that unconsciousness is a necessary 
prerequisite for philosophising to an interest in employing occult 
practices for such an end. 
 There is a moment each of us experiences on the verge of 
sleep, the characters speculate, that gives rise to an unconscious 
lucidity:  
 
At the moment of falling into one’s final slumber, an 
indescribable joy flows from one’s entire being, and here 
the soul is in its finest moral and spiritual activity at the 
same time . . . This mid-condition between waking and 
sleeping . . . is so infinitely different from anything that 
we call a dream that its clarity surpasses even the most 
                                                                                                              
84 Schelling, Werke, 4:88. For an analysis of similar claims made in the 
early Critical Letters, see Alberto Toscano, “Fanaticism and Production: On 
Schelling’s Philosophy of Indifference,” Pli 8 (1999). To make explicit the 
contemporary stakes of this discussion, c.f. Brassier’s insistence on the 
question, “How does thought think the death of thought?”—namely for 
genuinely nihilistic thought of the outside to occur, “the subject of 
philosophy must [somehow] recognise that he or she is already dead.” Ray 
Brassier, Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007), 223, 239. As I have argued, the Schellingian suicidal 
exercises that form a speculative life are preparatory to the description of a 
realm outside of human life. What they make possible, to quote the final 
words of Thacker’s After Life, is “to think a concept of life that is itself, in 
some basic way, unhuman, a life without us” (Eugene Thacker, After Life 
[Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010], 268). 
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vivid waking thoughts, and any normal mode of existing 
seems to be only a dream . . . Everything is differentiated 
in detail and is completely without confusion. This 
condition, however, usually lasts only a second; it 
disappears in a sudden, shuddering movement.85 
 
Such a moment of “waking sleep”86 is death-like to the extent that 
death is itself the “last sleep” in which “those who have escaped 
sleep from within sleep . . . have thereby penetrated through to a 
waking state.”87 Yet it is available to the living. This leads the priest 
to affirm the maxim: “Only he who could do while awake what he 
has to do while asleep would be the perfect philosopher.”88 The 
third dialogue revolves around the ideal of conscious 
unconsciousness, death-in-life. 
 However, as Clara makes clear, if such a moment of dreaming 
lucidity is experienced at all, it “lasts a second” and then 
“disappears in a sudden, shuddering moment.” The task for a 
speculative philosopher, therefore, is to artificially produce, 
reproduce and prolong this moment at will. It is here that she must 
appeal to occult practices and other “mysterious phenomena,”89 
such as hypnosis, since this moment of conscious unconsciousness 
is to be identified with the state of clairvoyance cultivated by the 
occult. Hypnosis is a strategy to effectuate “the highest 
clairvoyance.”90 Thus, Schelling describes the workings of hypnosis 
as follows:  
 
Through the influence of other people, human beings, 
acting as if dead toward everything apart from the 
influencer, and with their external senses completely 
deadened, can pass over into an internal clarity of the 
highest kind . . . If this is true, then I believe that here we 
would have the experience of a condition that we could 
justifiably call a higher one and that we could consider to 
be a wakeful sleep or a sleeping wakefulness. And I 
                                                                                                              
85 Schelling, Clara, 47. 
86 Ibid., 73. 
87 Ibid., 47. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid., 48. 
90 Ibid., 49. See further Horn, Schelling and Swedenborg, 6-8. 
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would thereby compare it not to death, but to the 
condition that follows death, and one which I believe will 
be the highest and which will be a clairvoyance 
uninterrupted by a waking up.91 
 
And yet the problem of articulation remains unsolved. In hypnosis, 
as in sleep and death, one ultimately loses consciousness and the 
experiences gained in a clairvoyant state are rarely preserved in 
memory. In other words, the above still does not amount to 
becoming-Swedenborg, for Swedenborg experienced the spirit 
world “fully awake, with my inner sight opened.” He remembered 
every detail and was able to communicate it soberly in text after 
text. Hypnosis remains an approximation to this ideal: it fails to 
satisfactorily indifferentiate immediate experience and art.92 
 For the Schelling of Clara, this is the problem that dialectic 
answers. Dialectic is the philosophical tool for becoming-
Swedenborg; however, it achieves this parity with the mystical text 
precisely by abandoning the Swedenborgian ideal in its purity. 
Mysticism is only part of the story; instead, the philosopher must 
diversify and embrace impurity—an impurity in which the 
philosopher oscillates or (in the language of Clara) “rotates” 
between mystic experience and concept-construction.93 The 
rhythm of this rotation defines philosophical dialectic. Whereas the 
mystic is lucky enough to wholeheartedly pursue her end, the 
philosopher must compromise and become composite. It is with 
this in mind that the priest insists on Clara pursuing conceptual 
clarity alongside spiritual ecstasis: 
                                                                                                              
91 Ibid., 47-8; my emphases. And crucially the characters add that 
“approaching that higher sleep is very similar to approaching death.” Ibid., 
48. 
92 And so the doctor still insists in the third dialogue: “And yet . . . this 
condition [of clairvoyance] is still merely an approximation to the highest 
one” (ibid.). 
93 Ibid., 35. As is stated in the third dialogue, “What is delicate or spiritual 
receives its highest worth only by asserting its nature through mixing with a 
conflicting, even barbaric, element” (ibid., 77; my emphasis). Mixing is the 
formal criterion for Schellingian philosophy as a whole, see further Daniel 
Whistler, Schelling’s Theory of Symbolic Language: Forming the System of Identity 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 238-9; and, in reference to the 
novelistic style of Clara in particular, see Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and 
Jean-Luc Nancy, “Le dialogue des genres” in Poétique 21 (1975), 168-72. 
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What [Clara] lacked was the ability to unpack her 
thoughts and thereby clarify them. I know what an 
agreeable effect ordering one’s own thoughts into a 
precise framework has; the soul is happy when it can 
have what it felt inwardly, as if by inspiration or through 
some divine thought, expressly worked out in the 
understanding, too, as if looking in a mirror.94 
 
The speculative mirror reappears at the climax of Clara, once more 
as the culmination of philosophical activity. One must cultivate 
and ameliorate one’s experience until it is “as if looking in a 
mirror.” Speculation is only attained once the immediacy of 
experience has passed through the rigours of an art of immediacy. 
Such a process does not destroy immediacy; it makes the 
philosophical presentation of it possible. Ultimately, the 
speculative mirror potentiates, not annihilates, the mystic vision of 
the spirit world. 
 
5. DEATH AND/OR THE DIALECTIC 
Schelling is a philosopher of mediated immediacy; Schelling 
is a philosopher of the dialectic; Schelling is a philosopher who 
conceives death-like negation as a necessary moment in 
philosophising. And yet Schelling is not a Hegelian philosopher. 
The common search for the speculative standpoint connects 
Hegelian and Schellingian thinking, but once on their quest each 
embarks on a series of idiosyncratic experiments in the silvering of 
mirrors. German Idealism does not consist in a linear narrative; it 
does not posit one definitive orthodoxy and various alternatives to 
it. German Idealism is entirely constituted by non-standard 
speculations—the manufacture of weird and wonderful looking-
glasses. For Schelling, mystical traditions form much of the 
material out of which such mirrors are silvered. Böhmean 
theosophy is such a crucial dialogue partner precisely because of 
what it lacks—a mirror adequate to its visions of God. Swedenborg, 
however, forges his own mirror—“a magical and symbolic mirror” 
that perfectly produces the indifference of mediacy and immediacy 
                                                                                                              
94 Ibid., 31. Schelling makes a similar point in the Introduction to the 
Weltalter fragments. See F.W.J. Schelling, The Ages of the World, trans. Jason 
M. Wirth (Albany: SUNY Press, 2000), xxxviii. 
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characteristic of the speculative standpoint. The philosopher strives 
in vain to replicate this Swedenborgian miracle. Ultimately and 
belatedly, she must choose between two inferior substitutes—death 
or the dialectic. 
 
In the Introduction, I suggested that at issue in the language of 
speculation and reflection pulsing through Hegel and Schelling’s 
work is the type of mirroring activity to which thoughts, feelings 
and visions are to be subjected. Such mediation must manage to 
keep the philosopher face to face with her material, free from 
falsification. Moreover, implicitly for Hegel and very explicitly (as 
I have argued) for Schelling, this question of the kind of mirror to 
be silvered leads directly to an interrogation of the very personality 
of the philosopher herself. The art of immediacy emerges out of a 
speculative form of life—those pre-philosophical, pre-textual 
practices that make one a speculative, rather than a reflective 
philosopher. What is more, the preceding has shown the 
significance of mystical forms of life for Schelling’s depiction of the 
speculative philosopher. 
 The question is, therefore, not merely: who dares to face 
experience in a mirror—the philosopher or the mystic (as Schelling 
asks of Böhme)? Nor is it merely: which of them silvers a mirror 
capable of bearing the glare of experience? But more critically still: 
who are these philosophers and mystics—what breed of silverer are 
they? Schelling confronts the mystic with the challenge: who are 
you to do what you do?—just as we must challenge Schelling. And 
as a result of this challenge, he goes on to appropriate much from 
the mystic, even if (as is always the case in Schelling’s post-1809 
output) such appropriation is channelled through indirections and 
feints. Schelling learns from the mystic’s failure, from the mystic’s 
inimitable success, as well as from what can still be imitated. He 
plunders the mystical text, as he plundered vocabularies, styles and 
concepts throughout his career. Schelling’s systematic eclecticism 
devours everything in the formation of the absolute system. He 
leaves nothing out—the mystical text included.95 The impure 
                                                                                                              
95 This would give further significance to the remark attributed to 
Schelling from the 1820s, “If this Tafel [a Swedenborg scholar] could get 
Swedenborg into a system, that would be something!” See further Horn, 
Schelling and Swedenborg, 2. On systematic eclecticism, see Whistler, 
Schelling’s Theory of Symbolic Language, Chapter Eleven. 
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mixture of the Schellingian dialectic is emblematic of this, cobbling 
together mystic intuition, conceptual analysis and scientific 
experimentation. 
 And yet in Clara the dialectic is only invoked under a veil of 
melancholy as an inferior surrogate for those neither inspired by 
mystic vision nor brave enough to die. In the wake of Caroline’s 
death, Schelling surveys the prospects for those unlucky enough to 
have no sustained connection to the departed (whether in life, like 
Swedenborg, or though death)96 and what remains is the dialectic. 
So, for the sake of the absolute system (and so the rational 
reconstruction of the spirit world), the philosopher must 
mournfully and regretfully carry on salvaging the scattered shards 
of mysticism. 
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